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013.02.0Abstract Survivability strengthening/vulnerability reduction designs have become one of the most
important design disciplines of military aircraft now. Due to progressiveness and complexity of modern
combat aircraft, the existing vulnerability modeling and computation methods cannot meet the current
engineering application requirements. Therefore, a vulnerability modeling and computation method
basedonproduct structure andCATIA is proposed in sufﬁcient considerationof the design characteristics
ofmodern combat aircraft. Thismethod directly constructs the aircraft vulnerabilitymodel by CATIA or
the digitalmodel database, andmanages all the product componentsof the vulnerabilitymodel via aircraft
product structure. UsingCAA second development, the detailed operations and computationmethods of
vulnerability analysis are integrated into CATIA software environment. Comprehensive assessment data
and visual kill probability Iso-contours can also be presented, which meet the vulnerability analysis
requirementsofmodern combat aircraft effectively.The intact vulnerabilitymodel of onehypothetical air-
craft is constructed, and the effects of redundant technology to the aircraft vulnerability are assessed,
which validate the engineering practicality of the method.
ª 2013 Production and hosting by Elsevier Ltd. on behalf of CSAA & BUAA.
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.1. Introduction
Aircraft combat survivability is deﬁned as the capability of an
aircraft to avoid or withstand a man-made hostile environment,88495914.
(J. Li), Yangw@cadi.ac.cn
. Pei).
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10and includes two aspects as susceptibility and vulnerability.
Vulnerability assessment and reduction are important measures
to improve aircraft’s survivability. Currently, survivability
strengthening/vulnerability reduction designs have become
one of the most important design disciplines of military aircraft.
The newest manned and unmanned combat aircraft, such as
F/A-18E/F, F/A-22, F-35, ‘‘Global Hawk’’, ‘‘Predator’’, etc.,
have adopted survivability strengthening/vulnerability reduc-
tion measures in the initial research phases,1–5 and carried out
detailed vulnerability assessment about material selections and
equipment dispositions, etc.6–9
Vulnerability modeling and quantitative computation are
two major important and complicated aspects for vulnerabilitySAA & BUAA. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
Fig. 1 Vulnerability modeling steps based on product structure.
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bility assessment, lots of programs and software have been
developed by American researchers, to name a few, vulnerabil-
ity modeling software BRL-CAD, shot-line generation pro-
grams SHOTGEN and FASTGEN, vulnerable area
computation program VAREA, vulnerable area and repair
time computation program COVART, missile endgame com-
putation programs ESAMS, JSEM, AJEM, etc.5,10
Some colleges and aircraft design institutes in China started
vulnerability modeling and quantitative computation research
in the 90s of the 20th century, e.g., Northwestern Polytechnical
University developed a vulnerability modeling method and cor-
responding vulnerability assessment software AVCAS based on
ﬁnite elements,11,12 Nanjing University of Science and Technol-
ogy developed vulnerability assessment software for aircraft to
fragment warheadsATVASS,13 ChinaAcademy of Engineering
and Physics developed warhead lethality/target vulnerability
assessment software WLTVAS,14 etc. At the same time, some
vulnerability assessments of aircraft and missiles were taken
by Chinese researchers,15–17 and vulnerability modeling and
computation software were improved, but these methods and
software still have some disadvantages in practical applications,
for example, too simple models, comparatively complicated
modeling methods, excessively intricate analysis processes,
insufﬁciency visualization, and so on. These disadvantages
greatly limited assessment and improvement of combat air-
craft’s vulnerability.
In this paper, a vulnerability modeling and computing
method based on product structure and CATIA software is
proposed in sufﬁcient consideration of modern combat air-
craft’s design characteristics. With this method, an aircraft vul-
nerability model including diverse conﬁguration, complex
structure, large systems, etc., can be constructed. That can
ameliorate modeling efﬁciency and model accuracy, and pro-
vide good three-dimensional manipulation and visualization.
On that foundation, initial vulnerability computation meth-
ods are improved by CAA second development, which makes
analysis operations, e.g., vulnerability attribute setting, shot-
line generation, kill tree construction, and kill impact assess-
ment, become convenient. Detailed vulnerability data and kill
probability Iso-contour, with respect to single hit, multi hits,
and missile fragment hit, can be presented. This method can
also provide references for other large complicated weapon
systems’ vulnerability modeling and computation.
2. Aircraft vulnerability modeling method based on product
structure
The basic requirement of vulnerability modeling is to describe
geometry characteristics, physical characteristics, kill modes,
etc., of the whole aircraft and its components by a series of
models or data. These information is stored and managed by
a computer, and is used to vulnerability computation.
2.1. Basic modeling steps
Modeling based on patch is a widely used vulnerability model-
ing method. With this method, the conﬁguration and compo-
nent models of aircraft are constructed by ﬁnite element
software, such as MSC.PATRAN, and the data ﬁles used to
describe the aircraft’s conﬁguration and components are con-stituted bymesh plotting.12With increasing complexity of mod-
ern combat aircraft, modeling based on patch cannot meet the
vulnerability modeling requirements in the aspects of time and
precision. Now the design of modern advanced combat aircraft
generally adopts large CAD/CAE/CAM software, and CATIA
is widely used in major aircraft design institutes of China as an
advanced design and analysis platform. One key use of CATIA
in aircraft design and analysis is carrying out product modeling,
assembly, management, and state control based on aircraft
product structure. All the components of the aircraft, including
conﬁguration components, structure components, system com-
ponents, etc., are constructed as three-dimensional digital mod-
els and stored in computer database. The congregation of all the
three-dimensional digital models is namely the aircraft digital
prototyping. Therefore, modeling based on the aircraft product
structure is actually a process of constituting the whole aircraft
digital prototyping by fully making use of the component digital
models and themanagement capability of product structure tree
on aircraft products, systems, and whole aircraft as per the spe-
ciﬁc requirements of vulnerability analysis. The basic steps are
shown in Fig. 1.
2.2. Aircraft product structure
The precondition of modeling based on product structure is
the construction and management of the aircraft product
structure tree. Aircraft product structure tree is a hierarchy
system which takes the product (aircraft conﬁguration, aircraft
structure, aircraft system, etc.) as an operating object, and dis-
assembles the product level-by-level according to certain
taxonomies and in terms of corresponding disciplines, charac-
teristics and structural subjecting relationships.18,19 One prod-
uct can consist of some sub-products with different hierarchies,
and every product has one and only product number, which is
used to identity and manage the product. The fractionizing de-
gree of the bottom product depends upon the expecting anal-
ysis precision, for example, a ﬂight control actuator can be
disassembled as actuator cylinder, actuator pole, actuator con-
trol, and hydraulic tubes. Each part of the four is constructed
as an independent sub-product. Whether the whole actuator
would be killed when one sub-product is killed depends upon
the kill logic of the sub-products vs the actuator. The actuator
can also be constructed as one product, and then the actuator
336 J. Li et al.would be killed if any part is killed. Generally, the parts of the
bottom product should have the same kill level and kill mode.
One aircraft product structure tree constituted by the meth-
od in this paper is shown in Table 1. The ﬁrst hierarchy of the
tree consists of three parts, i.e., aircraft conﬁguration, aircraft
structure, and aircraft system, and every part of the three con-
sists of some sub-products. Limited by paper length, only two
hierarchies are given here.
2.3. Aircraft product modeling
After the aircraft product structure tree is constituted com-
pletely, corresponding product models can be constructed.
The product models are constructed from low hierarchy to
high hierarchy, and every bottom product is constructed as
a component. The modeling operations are carried out in
CATIA software environment directly. Using CATIA, di-
verse complex conﬁguration surfaces can be constructed in
the Shape Module, and all kinds of complex part entity
can be created in the Mechanical Design Module. After allTable 1 One aircraft product structure tree with two
hierarchies.
Product code Product name
0 Conﬁguration
0_01 Conﬁg-fore fuselage
0_02 Conﬁg-middle fuselage
0_03 Conﬁg-rear fuselage
0_04 Conﬁg-left canard wing
0_05 Conﬁg-right canard wing
0_06 Conﬁg-left wing
0_07 Conﬁg-right wing
0_08 Conﬁg-left V tail
0_09 Conﬁg-right V tail
1 Structure
1_01 Strut-fore fuselage
1_02 Strut-middle fuselage
1_03 Strut-rear fuselage
1_04 Strut-left canard wing
1_05 Strut-right canard wing
1_06 Strut-left wing
1_07 Strut-right wing
1_08 Strut-left V tail
1_09 Strut-right V tail
1_10 Strut-front gear
1_11 Strut-left main gear
1_12 Strut-right main gear
2 System
2_01 System-engine
2_02 System-auxiliary power
2_03 System-ﬂight control
2_04 System-avionics
2_05 System-weapon
2_06 System-fuel
2_07 System-hydraulic
2_08 System-electromechanical
2_09 System-power supply
2_10 System-environment control
2_11 System-safety
2_12 System-cockpit
2_13 System-wiring harnessthe product models are constructed, they can be assembled
in the Assembly Design Module according to the aircraft
product structure tree.20 By farther precise adjusting and ori-
entating, the ﬁnal integrated aircraft vulnerability model can
be constituted. Actually, at the aircraft’s detailed design
phase, all the product models are constructed by relational
system specialties and stored in the computer database.
Therefore, vulnerability researchers only need to download
the required product models and assemble them, which de-
creases a mass of intermediate modeling processes. As a
product structure model exists in CATIA environment as
assembling mode, researchers can change the product dispo-
sitions conveniently without any modiﬁcation of other
parameters, which means that researchers do not need to
reconstruct the model when they need to assess the vulnera-
bility characteristic of different dispositions.
According to public literatures and based on typical con-
ﬁguration characteristics, basic structure layouts, and typical
system compositions of modern advanced combat aircraft, a
hypothetical aircraft is proposed, and its vulnerability model
constituted by the method in this paper is shown in Fig. 2.
The model consists of 328 bottom product components,
which includes 68 conﬁguration components of 9 conﬁgura-
tion segments, 106 structure components of 12 structure
segments, and 154 system components of 13 aircraft
systems.Fig. 2 Vulnerability model of one hypothetical aircraft based on
product structure.
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product structure model
With CATIA software, on one hand, the aircraft’s product
structure model can be constructed conveniently, and on the
other hand, the methods and operations of quantitative vul-
nerability computation can be integrated into CATIA environ-
ment as window toolbar via CAA second development. The
basic process of quantitative vulnerability computation based
on aircraft’s product structure model is shown in Fig. 3.
3.1. Component attribute setting
The component (viz. the bottom product) attributes of aircraft
product include component material, kill level, kill mode, and
revision coefﬁcient of six directions’ kill probability. The setting
is carried out in the setting window generated by CAA secondary
development. If a user selects one product in CATIA, the setting
windowwill auto search the serial number and name of the prod-
uct itself and its lower hierarchies’ products, and then the user can
set the component attributes of these products one by one.
The materials included in the method of this paper in total
are 17 kinds, i.e., aluminum alloy, titanium alloy, steel, com-
posite materials, hydraulic oil, fuel, water, user deﬁned mate-
rial, etc. For some special materials (such as materials of
cockpit canopy and radome), the user can simulate their char-
acteristics by setting their ballistic limit constants via user de-
ﬁned material. The ballistic limit constants can be obtained
by simulation, test, or qualitative assessment.
The kill categories include attrition kill, mission abort kill,
and user-deﬁned kill. Four attrition kill levels are deﬁned as
KK, K, A, and B level. Mission abort kill level is deﬁned as
C level. User-deﬁned kill level is mainly used for some special
non-attrition kills, such as conﬁguration damage, structure
damage, and so on. The kill modes include penetration, com-
bustion, and explosion. Every kill mode has corresponding kill
criterion formulas.21 Although these formulas are obtained by
tests, they are universal to some extent. In order to satisfy
characteristics of different aircraft and product components,
the user can revise the kill probability coefﬁcient of six basic
directions (front, back, left, right, up, and down).
One simple revising method of component kill probability
coefﬁcient is: supposed the projection area of one component
in one attack direction is Sp, and the critical area of this com-
ponent is Scri, then the revising coefﬁcient can be expressed as
p ¼ Scri=Sp ð1ÞFig. 3 Basic processes of vulnerability computatio3.2. Shot-line generation
Compared with the size of aircraft and its components, the size
of projectile or fragment is relatively smaller, so the motion of
every projectile or fragment can be described as a shot-line. In
this paper, an approach called ‘‘three-dimensional shot-line
scanning approach’’ (3DSSA) is applied to obtain the pre-pro-
cess data of shot-lines.
Fig. 4 is a schematic representation of the 3DSSA. The ba-
sic processes of this approach are: in CATIA environment,
take the three-dimensional size of the product structure model
as limitation, take the deﬁned size of the shot-line grid cell as
spacing, and generate parallel lines one by one according to
the attack direction. For each line, carry out intersecting com-
putations with the aircraft’s surfaces and inner components,
and then the hitting parameters, i.e., the serial numbers,
names, materials, thickness, and dimensional positions of
those intersected components, are obtained. Form these
parameters as shot-line description data ﬁles to provide neces-
sary input for next vulnerability computation.
A shot-line grid of the hypothetical aircraft in (45, 45) at-
tack direction generated by 3DSSA is shown in Fig. 5. The grid
cell size is 100 mm · 100 mm, and there are 9664 shot-lines
intersecting with the aircraft in total.
3.3. Kill tree construction
After setting the aircraft’s component attributes, the kill tree of
every kill level can be constructed by logical AND gate, OR
gate, and VOTE gate which are used in reliability analysis.
The kill tree can exactly describe the logical relationships be-
tween the component kill and the aircraft kill. In order to be
stored and computed easily by a computer, the kill tree should
be conversed into min-cutset aggregations by min-cutset solv-
ing arithmetics.15 Min-cutset aggregation is a basic event
aggregation which means: if all the basic events occur, the
top event would occur. A simple kill tree is shown in Fig. 6.
In the kill tree construction process based on the product
structure model, the product codes and names can be ﬁltered
and listed level by level according to their system. When the
detailed kill logic is determined, the products can be chosen
and combined as an expanding kill tree, as shown in Fig. 6.
In this kill tree, all the products and logic gates can be added,
deleted, and modiﬁed by clicking directly. After the whole kill
tree is constructed, the min-cutset aggregation can be solved by
the program via speciﬁc min-cutset solving arithmetics, and
stored in the kill tree database.n based on aircraft’s product structure model.
Fig. 4 A schematic representation of 3DSSA.
Fig. 5 Shot-lines of one hypothetical aircraft in (45, 45) attack
direction.
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On foundation of shot-line’s pretreating data and combined
with the min-cutset aggregations, the aircraft’s vulnerability
attributes such as kill probability, vulnerable area, presented
area, etc., can be computed. The basic computing steps are
listed as follows:
(1) Take the pretreating data of shot-lines as input, compute
the threat’s motion state inside the aircraft, and then the
intersecting parameters, i.e., hitting velocity, hitting
angle, threat weight, threat size, etc., can be presented.
(2) Compute the kill probability of each component under
each shot-line according to the kill criteria formulas,
and then compute the vulnerable area and the kill prob-
ability of each shot-line according to the detailed kill
models.Fig. 6 A schematic represen(3) To compile statistics of all the shot-lines’ vulnerable
areas and kill probabilities, obtain each component’s
and the whole aircraft’s vulnerable areas and kill
probabilities.3.4.1. State-of-motion of threat
Fig. 7 is a schematic representation of the state-of-motion of
threat inside the aircraft. In this ﬁgure, there are three lethal
components in the attack direction (shot-line). pk/hi is the kill
probability of component i at the given shot-line hit. After
the threat penetrates the aircraft’s outer skin, the components
in the attack direction could be hit by the threat whose velocity
(V) and weight (W) have undergone losses. If the residual
velocity of the threat after penetrating the aircraft’s outer skin
is higher than the ballistic limit velocity V50 of the component,
the threat could penetrate the component, and its velocity and
weight would undergo losses again. The other components in
the ballistic trajectory could be hit similarly. At last, the threat
leaves the aircraft, or stops moving inside the aircraft, or is left
in the component inside.
In this paper, the ballistic trajectory and state-of-motion
after the threat hitting the metal plate are computed by the
JTCG/ME equations, and the detailed computing process is
described in Refs.22,23. The ballistic trajectory and state-of-mo-
tion after the threat hitting the composite material plate are
computed by a physical method, and the detailed computing
process is described in Ref.24. The limit ballistic velocity of
the composite material plate is
V50 ¼ ð1þ kÞ 2rs
KWq
exp
KWqSmaxh
mf
 
 1
  1=2
ð2Þ
where V50 is the ballistic limit velocity, m/s; rs the shear
strength limit of punching type, Pa; KW the inertial resistance
coefﬁcient of the threat; q the material density, kg/m3; Smax
the max cross section area of the threat, m2; h the thickness
of the plate, m; mf the mass of the fragment, kg; k a correction
coefﬁcient with a value of 0.05–0.25.3.4.2. Kill criteria of component
After the state-of-motions of the threat are obtained, the kill
probability of the component can be computed according to
the speciﬁc parameters. For metal material, the statistical for-
mula of kill probability is obtained based on duralumin mate-
rial, thus the thickness of a component with different materials
should be equivalent to its thickness with duralumin material.
The equivalent formula25 istation of K level kill tree.
Fig. 7 A schematic representation of the state-of-motion of
threat inside the aircraft.
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 2=3
ð3Þ
where dst is the equivalent thickness of the material, cm; dx the
real thickness of the material, cm; rx the tensile strength limit
of the material, MPa; qx the density of the material, kg/m
3; rst
the tensile strength limit of duralumin material; qst the density
of duralumin material.
Three kill criteria are mainly considered for the kill modes
of components. They are penetration, combustion, and explo-
sion. The kill probability formulas are listed as follows.21
(1) Kill criteria of penetration
Penetration kill is mainly aimed at the aircraft structure and
equipment. Supposed pk/hij is kill probability of component i at
given hit j, for metal material, the penetration probability is
pk=hij¼
0 Es 4:5
1þ2:65expð0:34EsÞ2:96expð0:14EsÞ Es> 4:5

ð4Þ
where Es is speciﬁc kinetic energy received by unit component
thickness, (kgÆm/cm2)/mm.
ES ¼ mfv
2
f
2Smwheq
ð5Þ
where vf is the hitting velocity, m/s; Smw the mean windward
area of the threat, cm2; heq is the equivalent thickness of the
component, cm.
For composite material, the kill probability can be com-
puted by
pk=hij ¼
1
1þ exp  a
2gV50
vh  ð1þ gÞV50 þ ð1 gÞV50
2
   
ð6Þ
where a is the curve ﬁtting coefﬁcient; g the adjusting coefﬁ-
cient of penetration velocity with a value of 0.2–0.5, (1 + g).
V50 the velocity with complete penetration, and (1  g)V50
the velocity without penetration.
(2) Kill criteria of combustion
Combustion kill is mainly aimed at the aircraft fuel tanks.
The combustion effect depends on the speciﬁc impulse of the
threat, the explosion altitude, and the fuel tank structure.
The speciﬁc impulse of the threat is
I ¼ mfvf=Ap ð7Þ
where Ap is the effective presented area of the threat, and the
unit of I is kgÆm/(cm2Æs).With respect to single threat that ﬁres fuel in a fuel tank at
ground, the experiential formula of combustion probability is
pcom ¼
0 I  1:57
1þ 1:083e0:43I  1:96e0:15I I > 1:57

ð8Þ
As the air temperature and air pressure fall down with
increasing altitude, the fuel temperature falls down synchro-
nously. Moreover, the oxygen content is low at high altitude,
so the combustion probability decreases while the explosion
altitude increases. If the explosion altitude is higher than
16 km, the fuel would not ﬁre when the threat hits the fuel
tank. The combustion probability at high altitude is
pk=hij ¼ pcom 1
H
16
 2" #
ð9Þ
where H is the explosion altitude of the threat, km.
(3) Kill criteria of explosion
Explosion kill is mainly aimed at aircraft weapons and am-
mos. When the threat impacts the ammos, blast may be gener-
ated in the detonator cylinder. When the blast spreads in the
detonator, the pressure, density, and temperature at the wave-
front increase rapidly, which generates asymmetrical stress in-
side the detonator, and stress peaks may appear at some
points, which would heat local area and result ‘‘hotspots’’. If
the temperatures of these ‘‘hotspots’’ are higher than the
decomposing temperature of the detonator, the detonator
may explode. The more ‘‘hotspots’’ are generated inside the
detonator at unit time, the higher explosion probability is.
The experiential formula of explosion probability summa-
rized by experiments, viz., pex, is
pex ¼
0 Uj < 0
1 3:03 expð5:6UjÞ sinð0:34þ 1:84UjÞ Uj > 0

ð10Þ
Uj ¼ 10
8A1  a1  0:065
1þ 3a2:311
ð11Þ
A1 ¼ 5 103qdm2=3f v3f ð12Þ
a1 ¼ 5 102qsbs=m1=3f ð13Þ
where qd is the density of the detonator, kg/m
3; qs the shell
density of the ammo, kg/m3; bs the shell thickness of the
ammo, cm.
3.4.3. Vulnerability attributes
(1) Single-hit vulnerability attributes
The presented area of component i can be expressed as
APi ¼
XM
j¼1
ðw hÞ ð14Þ
where M is the number of the grid cells hit by shot-lines at the
component surface.
The presented area of the whole aircraft can be expressed as
AP ¼
XL
j¼1
ðw hÞ ð15Þ
where L is the number of the shot-line grid cells on the aircraft.
The vulnerable area of component can be expressed as
Table 2 The initial and reduced redundancy states.
Component name Initial
redundancy
Reduced
redundancy
340 J. Li et al.AVi ¼
XM
j¼1
ðpk=hij  w hÞ ð16Þ
Assume Pk/Hi is the kill probability of component i:
Pk=Hi ¼ AVi
AP
ð17Þ
After the kill probability of every critical component is ob-
tained, the aircraft kill probability, PK/H, and the aircraft vul-
nerable area, AV, can be obtained according to detailed kill
tree.
(2) Multi-hit vulnerability attributes
The traditional solving methods of multiple-hit kill proba-
bility are the ‘‘kill tree diagram method’’ and ‘‘Markov chain
method’’. These two methods are both based on aircraft’s
independent existing states, however, when the amount of
redundant components increases, the computation of multi-
hit could have ‘‘combination explosion’’ problem. At this time,
the computing time would become very long. However, mod-
ern combat aircraft adopt a great deal of redundant compo-
nents, therefore, to solve the ‘‘combination explosion’’
problem in computation, a method called ‘‘random multi-hit
spots based on Monte-Carlo simulation’’ is adopted in this pa-
per. The basic steps of this method are:
(1) Generate the aircraft’s single-hit shot-lines ﬁrstly and
obtain the kill probabilities of these shot-lines by a sin-
gle-hit computation method.
(2) By Monte-Carlo simulation, generate n shot-lines ran-
domly on the aircraft in each simulation round to simu-
late n times hits, as shown in Fig. 8.
(3) By using the results of single hit and the kill tree, com-
pute the multi-hit result of each simulation round.
(4) By great amount of simulation (the simulation rounds
are not less than 1000), the mean kill probability of multi
hits can be obtained.
3.5. Vulnerability result presentation
The computing results of vulnerability have two types, one is
data result presented as data ﬁles, which can provide presented
area, vulnerable area, kill probability of each component and
the accumulative presented and vulnerable areas, kill probabil-
ity of the whole aircraft; and the other is kill probability Iso-
contour presented as ﬁgures, which can intuitively show theFig. 8 A schematic representation of random multi-hit spots.vulnerable area and single-hit kill probability distribution of
the aircraft with respect to one attack direction, and can index
the serial numbers and names of the components which are hit
by threat at any attack position. The drawing steps of kill
probability Iso-contour are described as follows:
(1) Divide the kill probability between [0, 1] into 10 equal
sections, and endow each section with one index color.
(2) Take the plane vertical to the attack direction as the
drawing plane.
(3) Begin from the ﬁrst shot-line, and if the shot-line hits the
vulnerable area of the aircraft, the shot-line grid cell is
ﬁlled with the index color deﬁned in Step (1) according
to the cell’s kill probability, or if the shot-line hits the
non-vulnerable area of the aircraft, the shot-line grid cell
is ﬁlled with the index color of 0 kill probability.
(4) Fill the shot-line grid cells with an index color one by
one until all the shot-line grid cells are ﬁlled.
4. Case study
Based on the aircraft vulnerability model constructed above,
the effects of redundancy technology to aircraft vulnerability
are assessed.
The aircraft system components include 12 groups of dual
redundant components, ﬁve groups of triple redundant com-
ponents, six groups of four redundant components, and lethal
redundant components of B kill level are 18 groups. Now re-
duce the redundancies of B kill level redundant components
and assess the aircraft vulnerability before and after redun-
dancy reduction. The redundancy states before and after
redundancy reduction are shown in Table 2.
Assume the threat parameters are: 23 mm armor piercing
incendiary (API), the projectile length is 99.3 mm, the projec-
tile mass is 194.4 g, the hitting altitude is 3000 m, and the hit-
ting velocity is 1800 m/s. The attack directions are (45, 45)
and (45, 45), and the hitting times are 1, 3, and 5. When
the hitting times are 3 and 5, the Monte-Carlo simulationOxygen bottle Four Dual
Hydraulic gas bottle Four Dual
Electric-load management unit Four Single
DC/AC current convertor Four Dual
Power distribution box Triple Dual
Flight control computer Triple Two
Actuator control box Triple Single
Electromechanical management computer Triple Single
Engine Dual Dual
Aircraft accessory drive gear Dual Dual
Hydraulic pump Dual Single
Hydraulic oil tank Dual Single
Dynamotor Dual Dual
Battery Dual Single
Flight power control box Dual Single
Gas/ﬂuid radiator Dual Single
Navigation module Dual Single
Table 3 Aircraft vulnerability data before and after redun-
dancy reduction.
Redundant
state
Hitting
times
Vulnerable area (m2) Kill probability
(45, 45) (45, 45) (45, 45) (45, 45)
Initial
redundant
1 22.74 22.94 0.2350 0.2425
3 52.46 53.83 0.5421 0.5563
5 92.43 95.22 0.9552 0.9840
Reduced
redundant
1 38.16 36.58 0.3945 0.3868
3 75.34 74.45 0.7786 0.7694
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tours of initial redundancy are shown in Fig. 9, and the single-
hit kill probability Iso-contours of reduced redundant are
shown in Fig. 10.
By comparing Fig. 9 with Fig. 10, it can be seen that the
vulnerable area after redundancy reduction increases, espe-
cially the region of fore fuselage where the products dispose
densely.
The aircraft vulnerability data before and after redundancy
reduction are shown in Table 3.5 91.78 95.64 0.9485 0.9883
Fig. 10 Kill probability Iso-contours of reduced redundant.
Fig. 9 Kill probability Iso-contours of initial redundant.It can be seen that redundancy increasing can improve the
aircraft vulnerability notably. At single-hit case, the kill prob-
ability is reduced approximately 15% compared to the reduced
redundancy state; at 3-hit case, the kill probability is reduced
more than 20% compared to the reduced redundancy state,
and the improving effect is the most notable. When the hitting
number increases to 5 times, the kill of the aircraft is remark-
able and the redundancy technology cannot improve the air-
craft vulnerability effectively.
5. Conclusions
(1) The vulnerability modeling method based on product
structure and CATIA, which constructs the aircraft con-
ﬁguration components, structure components, and sys-
tem components directly by CATIA software, and
manages products/components of different hierarchies
by product structure, reduces vulnerability modeling
complexity and improves modeling effectiveness
together with model accuracy. Furthermore, the method
can sufﬁciently use the digital model database of modern
aircraft designs, which can meet the vulnerability analy-
sis requirements of modern combat aircraft with large
complicated systems effectively.
(2) By using the component operating and managing func-
tions of CATIA, the vulnerability model based on prod-
uct structure can carry component attribute setting,
shot-line generation, kill tree construction, etc., conve-
niently, which enables researchers to easily obtain the
aircraft vulnerability attributes with respect to different
component materials, kill modes, and kill logics. That
can provide useful guidance for the selection/improve-
ment of component materials and damage suppression
measures. Besides, the assembling characteristics of the
product structure model allow researchers to adjust the
component dispositions conveniently when they analysis
the vulnerability characteristics with different compo-
nent dispositions. Moreover, the vulnerability analysis
environment based on CATIA makes the operating
and analyzing processes have good visualization.
(3) The quantitative vulnerability computation based on
product structure and CATIA makes sufﬁcient use of
the existing mature computation methods, takes diverse
component materials, e.g., aluminum, titanium, com-
posite materials, some kinds of ﬂuid, etc., into consider-
ation, and contains three kill modes, i.e., penetration,
342 J. Li et al.combustion, and explosion. The vulnerability attributes
with respect to non-explosive impactor’s single-hit,
multi-hit, and missile fragments hit can be given and
excellent visual kill probability Iso-contours can be pre-
sented, which provide good references for precise vulner-
ability analysis of modern aircraft.Acknowledgment
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